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The role of underlying assumptions about justice in the construction of climate geoengineering 
knowledge is explored, based on a review of climate modelling studies focused on stratospheric 
aerosol injection. Such emerging technologies would create distinctively new climates, closer to the 
present climate than those resulting from unabated emissions; but with different winners and losers, in 
part as a result of implications for energy systems. Embedded presuppositions about the nature and 
practice of modelling are exposed, as are unexplored and narrow utilitarian and distributional 
conceptions of justice. The implications of these underlying assumptions and values for the discourses 
of climate geoengineering are considered. It is argued that they obscure the identification and 
consideration of a range of potential injustices arising in the pursuit of climate geoengineering; and 
create and reproduce asymmetries in power regarding the discourses and evaluations of climate 
geoengineering prospects. In particular, optimistic climate geoengineering discourses risk sustaining 
elite interests in high-carbon energy economies. Some suggestions are offered to improve the design, 
deployment and interpretation of climate engineering models in trans-disciplinary research so as to 
mitigate these problems. 
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Climate geoengineering is increasingly debated as a response to the problems of climate change and 
excess carbon emissions from energy systems. In various forms it appears to offer a technical fix that 
may well deter or delay a transition to clean energy (Markusson et al 2017; Wibeck et al 2015; 
McLaren 2016a&b). In this paper I explore ways in which underlying utilitarian and consequentialist 
presuppositions about justice, expressed in climate modelling practices and results, may contribute 
to misleading discursive framings of technological optimism regarding the dominant form of solar 
climate geoengineering: stratospheric aerosol injection. In turn these framings risk stimulating a 
moral hazard effect in which geoengineering substitutes for mitigation, thus sustaining other 
negative impacts and injustices of fossil fuel extraction and use. 
Climate geoengineering techniques are typically divided into carbon dioxide reduction (CDR) and 
solar radiation management (SRM). CDR involves removing greenhouse gases from the atmosphere, 
and, as a technical fix, promises future recovery of current emissions. CDR is not considered further 
here, but is already embedded in climate pathways models as a means to square carbon budgets to 
meet particular temperature targets (Fuss et al 2014; Anderson 2015; Peters and Geden 2017). SRM 
reduces the proportion of the sun’s heat captured in the earth system, typically by reflecting more 
sunlight. Stratospheric aerosol injection (SAI), which dominates the geoengineering literature (Linnér 
and Wibeck 2015), would reflect sunlight by dispersing small particulates into the stratosphere using 
aircraft, artillery or a balloon-lofted pipe, and thus reduce global temperatures through the same 
basic mechanism as occurs with large volcanic eruptions.  
Although such interventions are yet little more than technological imaginaries and their future 
evolution as co-constitutive parts of socio-technical systems largely unknowable (Stilgoe 2015), 
increasingly detailed climate modelling work using Global Circulation Models (GCMs) has begun to 
sketch possible distributional climatic consequences of such imagined SRM interventions, treating 
them as concrete objects. As in the case of CDR, here the models also co-constitute these 
technological imaginaries, with very limited scope for empirical validation, and do so in a charged 
policy space in which the politics of climate denial largely prevents constructive questioning of 
modelling and its assumptions. This means that climate modellers arguably bear an elevated 
responsibility to consider the possible social consequences of their work. This paper seeks to suggest 
ways in which modellers, other climate researchers and policy makers could act reflexively to 
enhance contributions to justice in climate policy. 
To fully investigate the justice implications of climate geoengineering means considering how it 
might affect people across plural dimensions of distribution, vulnerability, capability, structural 
inequalities, procedure, recognition, and restoration or correction (Jasanoff 2003; Mamo and 
Fishman 2013; Schlosberg 2007, 2012; Shrader-Frechette 2002; Sen 2009; Jenkins et al 2016; 
Hourdequin 2016). Climate change is not simply a justice issue because its effects are spatially and 
temporally uneven, as often presumed in the climate geoengineering modelling literature, it is also a 
justice issue because vulnerability to those effects is also uneven, and tightly inter-linked with 
existing economic, political and cultural injustices and power imbalances, in which the victims are 
often poorly recognized, their rights not respected and compensation resisted (Athanasiou and Baer 




change are also tightly interwoven with energy systems and their justice implications (Sovacool et al 
2015; Jenkins et al 2016). Geoengineering may imply significant energy demands, impact 
differentially on different energy sources, or promise to reduce climate risk while allowing continued 
exploitation of fossil fuels (McLaren 2016a, b).  It cannot be assumed simply that a reduction in 
overall climate risks will necessarily enhance justice. It is important to ask who will lose or gain, 
where, when, and in what respects. 
As outlined below, modelling of SAI predominantly suggests that it could - at a gross, global scale - 
significantly reduce, or at least mask, the impacts of unabated climate change. And, given that 
existing and likely impacts of climate change are disproportionately borne by the poor and 
disadvantaged, it might be argued that the deployment of SAI would enhance justice (Horton and 
Keith 2016). But there are also reasons to significantly qualify or even dismiss such a claim. First SAI 
is not a perfect substitute for mitigation (Keith 2013), and the distribution of residual and novel 
impacts could be important for an unknown proportion of the poor and disadvantaged. Second, 
insofar as SAI acts as a substitute for, or deters, mitigation (McLaren 2016a; Morrow 2014b), any 
negative side-effects of SAI would be magnified, and any co-benefits of mitigation reduced. 
Moreover any failure of SAI in practice would then result in more severe climate impacts than had 
mitigation not been deterred (Baatz 2016), although the justice implications of this would depend to 
some extent on whose emissions had continued. In particular, if SAI permitted greater use of fossil 
energy in poor Southern countries, it might enhance energy justice, but if it rather sustained energy 
rich lifestyles in the global North, the opposite would result. Third, justice arguably has richer and 
plural dimensions - beyond those defined in terms of consequential harms and benefits (Sen 2009) - 
in which climate risk may be a poor proxy for justice. In this paper I explore how the presumptions 
and practices of climate geoengineering modelling tend to downplay such qualifications, thus 
sustaining a discourse of climate geoengineering that despite being cautious, is nonetheless 
inappropriately rosy.  
The significance of models and modelling 
Before discussing the detailed findings and implications of climate geoengineering modelling, it is 
necessary to briefly consider the status and purpose of such scientific models. Researchers have 
developed increasingly sophisticated computer models – using both physical principles and historical 
climate data - in efforts to predict and understand the implications of rising greenhouse gas 
concentrations (Edwards 2011; Flato 2011; Curry and Webster 2011). Despite substantial 
uncertainties, climate models have contributed to a substantial improvement in our understanding 
of the relationships between energy systems and climate change. In the context of climate 
engineering, they provide illuminating opportunities to simulate - and experiment with - alternative 
conditions, scenarios and pathways in ways that are simply impossible empirically. This implies a 
responsibility to communicate assumptions and limitations carefully and clearly, but in the context 
of bitterly contested climate politics such caveats are rarely heard, even when offered. As a result 
climate models have been described as ‘seductive simulations’ (Lahsen 2005) and ‘technologies of 
hubris,’ offering a misplaced modernist concept of management and control that pre-empts political 
discussion (Jasanoff 2003). They are embedded in an administrative risk-management social 
imaginary (Groves 2014) which depoliticizes climate change in critical ways (Swyngedouw 2010). 




ordering devices between science and authority that sideline uncertainty (Shackley and Wynne 
1996). As a result modelling co-constitutes particular sorts of worlds. As in the case of energy system 
research and models (Sovacool et al 2015), climate models tend to constitute technologically-framed 
worlds, rather than social ones. Nonetheless, such models are now being deployed and further 
refined technically to explore the potential implications of climate geoengineering. It must be 
stressed at this point that the constructivist effects of modelling are not the intentional product of 
modellers, but an emergent result of the co-production of models, technologies, discourses, 
imaginaries and institutions in this space. This makes for a difficult epistemological and 
methodological challenge. Empirical investigation of the beliefs and intents of modellers (for 
instance through qualitative interviews), although potentially useful, could not reveal and explain 
such outcomes. Here a critical, discursive review of the modelling literature is applied in an effort to 
begin to expose the co-productive relations between models and values which structure climatic 
imaginaries.  An analysis of the outputs of practices (the modelling literature) is an essential first 
step in exposing and understanding presumptions arising in the social imaginary which shapes such 
practices. At times I will speculate as to modellers’ motivations, but the central case I seek to make is 
that their modelling practices embody and construct particular ethics and values regardless of 
modellers’ intentions. 
Because the future state of the climate and the effectiveness of climate policy are complex and 
indeterminate, the status that models are granted critically structures the interpretation of scientific 
evidence. Models may be treated in diverse ways across a spectrum from ‘truth machines’, to more 
honest ‘sandpits’ for experimentation (Galarraga and Szerszynski 2012) or ‘props in games of make-
believe’ (Toon 2010). Audiences for models must ‘play the game’, which makes modelling a social 
activity (Corry 2015). So the use and interpretation of models depends heavily on a shared language, 
vocabulary and grammar and is thus co-constituted with disciplinary discourses. Wiertz (2016), 
suggests that model-based climate geoengineering research shapes social and political expectations 
around technologies, whilst underlying presumptions, such as the models’ reliance on a “figure of a 
single rational decision maker who designs and evaluates the performance of the technology" (p.454) 
remain unquestioned. Wiertz challenges us to question the “relation between model-based and 
social visions of climate futures” and the ethical and political questions raised by the practice of 
climate geoengineering modelling. Modellers often appear reticent to engage directly with such 
questions - which admittedly extend beyond the quantitative evidence base provided by modelling - 
within the scientific literature (see table 1). Yet in this very unwillingness, they tend to import 
unquestioned presumptions from the dominant social imaginary (Groves 2014) into their practices 
and interpretations, which can in turn be exposed by qualitative discursive analysis.  
This is a space in which scholarship is sparse. There is work on the ethics of the technologies and 
policies of climate engineering (Gardiner 2010; Morrow 2014; Svoboda 2016), some of which 
engages explicitly with economic modelling using Integrated Assessment Models (notably Hansson 
2014). Examinations of climate geoengineering from a science and technology studies orientation 
seek to open up framings and narratives to assist with the evaluation of climate geoengineering 
proposals (Bellamy 2016; Cairns and Stirling 2014) but this work tends to lack a clear normative 
dimension with respect to justice (Mamo and Fishman 2013). Finally, there are some researchers 
who use or examine modelling processes and seek to modify and weight outcomes in an effort to 




literature forms part of the papers examined here, and as will be seen, the epistemology involved 
tends to privilege certain forms of ethical judgement and certain values of justice. 
This paper focuses therefore on exploring and unpacking both explicit and hidden assumptions 
about justice. These presumptions arise at several levels: first in the modellers’ interpretation of 
their models’ outputs; second in the modelling practices; and third in values or conceptions of 
justice which researchers (typically unquestioningly) import into their modelling and analysis. The 
first part of the paper addresses each of these levels in turn, based on a focused review of the 
modelling literature. The second part of the paper then discusses how these interpretations, 
practices and values relate to discourses and framings of climate geoengineering with respect to risk, 
vulnerability and power, and considers the relevance of plural and relational dimensions of justice 
drawn from the environmental justice and science and technology studies literatures. This analysis is 
informed both by the literature, and by participant observation in major climate geoengineering 
conferences, symposia and summer schools.(1) Further work might helpfully elaborate this step by 
conducting formal qualitative interviews or deliberative engagements with modellers themselves, 
seeking to better understand and explore their motivations and ideas of justice. Nonetheless, simply 
putting the different literatures and discourses into dialogue is revealing and suggestive. Finally the 
paper draws conclusions regarding the possible implications of climate geoengineering for climate 
justice. 
Representations of justice in modelling of SRM  
Based on a broad literature review, involving iterated searches of Scopus and Web of Science, using 
the terms ‘geoengineering’ or ‘solar radiation management’ plus ‘regional effects’, ‘regional 
inequalities’ or ‘regional disparities’, I identified 11 key studies prior to 2016 that address spatial 
distributional implications (at a regional scale, rather than just global impacts). Although the initial 
search returned around 70 papers in total, I eliminated those that did not report climate system 
modelling, those that focused only on localised applications (eg protection of coral reefs), and those 
which did not consider SAI (although some simulate SAI by adjusting the solar constant). The 
remaining 11 papers are listed in table 1, and considered in this section, supported by references to 
other, often more fundamental modelling and non-model-based studies whose outputs are helpful 
to understanding ways in which climate geoengineering might impact on justice. The database 
searches were supplemented by on-going monitoring of geo-engineering list-servers (the geo-
engineering google group, and the Kiel Earth Institute’s climate engineering newsletter). The 
resultant set of papers may not be entirely comprehensive, but it is representative of the field, and 
of the evolution of research into the likely distributed impacts of SAI. The researchers and 
institutions involved go beyond what Kintish (2010) called the ‘geoclique’ although that group is 
strongly represented. Almost all of the papers identified have been widely cited (see table 1 for 
frequencies). 
In this section I first outline the key findings of modelling studies regarding the potential 
distributional effects of SAI, and discuss how they have been interpreted, particularly regarding 
consideration of winners and losers. I then turn to issues arising in the practices of modelling, with a 
focus on counterfactuals, uncertainties and vulnerability. Throughout, I quote directly from the 




and practices. I conclude the section with a brief summary of the concepts of justice revealed by the 
modelling.  
Model outputs and their interpretation 
Much of what scientists understand of the likely implications of SAI SRM comes from modelling 
studies (see Table 1, which summarises the key findings outlined in this section). The last decade has 
seen a rapid increase in climate geoengineering modelling, with increasingly sophisticated models, 
multiple model runs utilising increasing computer power, and in recent years, efforts to compare 
multiple models as part of the geoengineering model intercomparison project (GeoMIP) (Kravitz el al 
2014; Yu et al 2015; Schmidt et al 2012; Niemeier et al 2013). Simple models simply simulate a 
reduction in incoming solar radiation, while more sophisticated ones directly model stratospheric 
distributions of aerosols, providing more detail of dynamic and distributed effects. There is broad 
consensus in the modelling community (dominated by US, UK and German scientists), over the large-
scale effects of SAI, but still significant uncertainty (and even disagreement) over several parameters 
of significance for regional impacts, such as cloud effects or ocean circulation (Driscoll et al 2012; 
Schmidt et al 2012; Niemeier et al 2013; Curry et al 2014; McCusker et al 2015). Different models 
and even different runs tend to suggest different results – exposing significant inter-model variation 
(Yu at al 2015). 
Latitudes and hemispheres, temperature and precipitation 
Modelling suggests that even uniformly distributed reductions in solar radiation would have 
distributional consequences. Such SRM could broadly cool the planet (Kravitz et al 2014; Irvine et al  
2010; Robock et al 2008), but the temperature offsets achievable through uniform global SAI are 
expected to be latitudinally distributed, with “significant cooling of the tropics [but substantial 
residual] warming of high latitudes and related sea ice reduction” (Lunt et al 2008:1; also Schmidt et 
al 2012;  MacMartin, Keith et al, 2013). Effects on precipitation would be more diverse, with 
overcompensation for the effects of climate forcings in some regions and undercompensation in 
others (Robock et al 2008; Schmidt et al 2012; Curry et al 2014; Yu et al 2015). Changes in 
precipitation may be “quite small relative to interannual variability at the regional scale” (Bala et al 
2008:7668) but still significant. Schmidt et al (2012) found that regional precipitation changes may 
exceed those under unmitigated climate change, a finding supported by Ferraro et al (2014). 
Moreover the variations would be inconsistent. For instance, “simulated temperature and 
precipitation in large regions such as China and India vary significantly with different trajectories for 
[SRM], and they diverge from historical baselines in different directions” (Ricke et al 2010:537). 
Modelled precipitation divergences are more severe for SAI than solar dimming (Niemeier et al 
2013; Ferraro et al 2014). Ferraro et al find four times more area and population at risk of 
substantial increases in precipitation under SAI than solar dimming. Aerosols also have dynamic 
effects on atmospheric, and consequentially oceanic circulation. In the southern hemisphere, SAI 
might even warm deep ocean currents around Antarctica, a key driver of ice-sheet collapse and sea-
level rise (McCusker et al 2015). 
Modelling a larger aerosol loading in polar latitudes appears to compensate for the latitudinal 
distribution of temperature effects but not the ocean dynamics. Moreover it also “tends to degrade 




fully masking average temperature change is predicted to only reduce, but not eliminate changes in 
weather extremes (Curry et al 2014). Nor would it halt sea-level rise: to do that, as Irvine et al (2012) 
show, would require an average aerosol loading that would more than compensate for temperature 
rise.(2)  
Potential distributional consequences from precipitation changes are not insignificant. Early 
modelling by Robock et al (2008) suggested that both tropical and Arctic SAI would result in “a 
weakening of the African and Asian summer monsoon circulation, an effect found previously from 
high-latitude volcanic eruptions” (p.8). However, more recent modelling indicates less extreme 
implications (Schmidt et al 2012; Tilmes et al 2013). Nonetheless, MacMartin, Keith et al (2013) 
advocate seasonal distribution of SAI interventions to ameliorate the risk of negative effects on 
precipitation in monsoon regions. If SAI were heavily biased to one hemisphere the implications 
could be more dramatic. Haywood et al (2013:660) find that:  “large asymmetric stratospheric 
aerosol loadings concentrated in the Northern Hemisphere are a harbinger of Sahelian drought 
whereas those concentrated in the Southern Hemisphere induce a greening of the Sahel.” In a similar 
vein, Jones et al (2017) find that Southern hemisphere SAI would exacerbate North Atlantic tropical 
cyclone frequency relative to global SAI, while Northern hemisphere SAI would depress it.  Yet  
hemispherically asymmetric SRM intervention might be deliberate - not just a modelling fiction. 
Several authors have suggested or examined Arctic dominated SRM (eg Lunt et al 2008; Irvine et al 
2010; MacMartin, Keith et al 2013). Moreover, the only advocates for immediate deployment of SAI 
argue for Arctic deployment to prevent loss of sea ice and subsequent methane feedbacks.(3) Such an 
asymmetric deployment would need to be substantial. Tilmes et al (2014) estimate that the SRM 
forcing required to retain summer sea ice would be four times greater in a polar deployment than in 
a global one. 
Novel climates and modulated SRM 
SRM could not simultaneously compensate everywhere for changes in both precipitation and 
temperature. Climate geoengineering modellers have responded to this in two related ways: by 
seeking to assess the scale of ‘residual’ effects, and by modifying the scenarios they model in an 
effort to minimize those residuals. Moreno Cruz et al (2012) developed a ‘residual climate response’ 
approach that combines deviations in temperature and precipitation. Irvine et al (2010) quantify the 
extent of ‘novel climates’. And Ferraro et al (2014) develop a risk ratio to describe the likelihood of 
problematic novel climatic conditions. Modellers have explored modulating the levels and spatial 
and temporal distributions of SAI interventions. Yet, as explored below, the findings of such 
modelling are often interpreted and reported in ways that may underplay the implications of 
remaining distributional problems.  
Several studies have modelled levels of SAI that only partially mask temperature changes, to reduce 
the extent of harmful overcompensating precipitation changes. For example, Moreno-Cruz et al 
(2012) model returning an unabated 2xCO2 2030 climate to 1990s temperatures, and report that 
separately each factor can be almost perfectly corrected (97-99%). However, their abstract’s 
optimistic interpretation that “while inequalities in the effectiveness of SRM are important, they may 
not be as severe as it is often assumed” (p.649) is rather contradicted in the body of the paper. This 




precipitation at once. … the SRM scheme that minimizes … precipitation changes compensates for 
only 70% of … temperature changes” (p.651).  
And this remaining trade-off could have profound distributional consequences. Moreno-Cruz et al 
also state that: “the first region to reach its optimum as we incrementally increase SRM is Western 
Africa … [where] the optimal amount of SRM … is 78% of the [full amount] ... An increase in the level 
of SRM beyond this point makes Western Africa worse-off” (p.661). Moreno-Cruz et al estimate that 
78% of full SRM would compensate for 56% of global damages from climate warming. But they 
choose not to draw out the disturbing implication that to optimise for any other region - the 
mainland USA for example – or to seek to mask a higher proportion of global damages, would 
therefore make things relatively worse for some of the poorest countries in the world, when 
comparing it with SRM optimized for Western Africa. 
Some subsequent researchers have adopted a similar method of estimating residual climate 
responses (eg MacMartin et al 2014; Yu et al 2015). Yu et al, however, highlight how “large across-
model variation in the treatment of key geoengineering processes (such as stratospheric aerosols) 
and the quantification of damage caused by climate change creates significant uncertainties in any 
strategies to achieve optimal compensation effectiveness across different regions” (p.10). Others 
have sought to tame and quantify regional disparities arising from SAI by developing a concept of 
'novel climate', with the apparent ambition of modulating their modelled interventions so as to 
minimise the incidence of such novel climates. However this has highly problematic consequences 
for the framing of the climate justice problem. Irvine et al (2010) define a novel climate as “a climatic 
state, measured by either surface temperature or rainfall (annual or seasonal), that lies outside the 
continuum of climatic states bounded by the preindustrial and an unmitigated (4xCO2) greenhouse” 
(p.5). Their results show 'novel conditions' – primarily in precipitation, over up to 28-45% of the 
earth (from SAI designed to reverse 70-80% of the warming arising from 4xCO2 (Irvine et al, 2010: 
figure 3b)). To interpret this, as the authors do, as limiting novel climate states to 'only a small 
fraction' of the earth (p6), seems overly optimistic. Furthermore, in Irvine et al’s results, higher levels 
of SAI generate an even wider spread of both novel precipitation and temperature regimes. Yet their 
definition of novelty already normalises extreme climate change. A 4xCO2 climate is massively 
beyond human experience. If it is 'novelty' that signals the potential for significant harmful regional 
changes, but a 4xCO2 greenhouse is not considered novel, this frames the associated climate impacts 
of business as usual as more acceptable, so the historic injustices embedded in their causation are 
more easily overlooked. 
Even if SAI could be restrained to reduce disruptive effects on precipitation, it appears that there 
would still be significant areas with novel and potentially harmful climatic conditions, and many 
different or new winners and losers. Model inter-comparison appears to confirm this. Kravitz et al 
(2014) model SAI restricted to compensate only 85% of the difference from preindustrial 
temperatures, and suggest that, in a world divided into 22 regions, this delivers regional 
temperatures closer to preindustrial levels than to a 4xCO2 world “for all regions and all models” 
(p.1). However: “in all but one model, there is at least one region for which no amount of solar 
reduction can restore precipitation toward its preindustrial value” (p.1). Moreover, if only 
precipitation were considered significant, “11 of the 12 models show the [optimum] amount of 
geoengineering determined by the Pareto criterion to be zero”(p.4) and for nine of the 22 regions at 




climate change. Yet again, the interpretation of this work is given an optimistic spin. By weighting 
temperature and precipitation effects equally in their overall evaluation these authors conclude that 
SAI would create ‘no new winners and losers’. In reality, though, such an equal weighting is 
misleading: some regions and groups would be far more vulnerable to temperature impacts than 
precipitation changes, and vice versa.  
Ferraro et al (2014) are less optimistic. Using a somewhat different method of assessing novelty (a 
risk ratio, estimating the risk of experiencing a year in which the mean surface temperature or 
precipitation is outside one standard deviation of the current interannual variability), they find over 
40% of the Earth's surface experiencing increased risk of substantial precipitation change under 
4xCO2 plus SAI than under elevated CO2 alone. Some advocates of SRM research imply that optimism 
is justified by the potential for modulating the level of, and/or targeting the timing and locations of 
SAI (Irvine et al 2010; MacMartin et al 2014; Moreno Cruz et al 2012; Curry et al 2014)(4) Niemeier et 
al (2013) suggest that a global balancing of transient forcings with SAI may be possible, but raise 
some practical caveats. On the other hand, MacMartin, Keith et al (2013) introduce the possibility of 
not only varying the global level, but also fine-tuning both the latitudinal and seasonal distribution of 
SAI. They report that with such modulation: “residual temperature and precipitation changes in the 
worst-off region can be reduced by 30% relative to uniform solar reduction” (p.365).  But such 
benefits may be as imaginary as the technologies involved: they depend strongly on assumptions of 
controllability and uniform vulnerability, as discussed in the next section. 
Overall, therefore, the modelling appears to show that, in terms of global average effects, masking 
greenhouse forcings with SAI would probably leave most places better off than under unabated 
climate change. Yet SAI is not a perfect substitute for mitigation, nor can it restore previous 
climates.(5) SAI would reconfigure, or even make new climates, with serious implications for climate 
justice that must be considered in climate policy. There would be dynamic regional and temporal 
patterns of impact – at scales at which the model uncertainties are much greater - that could expose 
particular populations, across significant proportions of the world, to continued or enhanced risk. A 
significant minority might suffer undesirable shifts in precipitation regimes, only some of which 
might be mitigated somewhat by more targeted and refined application of SAI, even if that were to 
prove practical. While early modelling studies arguably exaggerated the possible implications of such 
impacts, much recent work appears to downplay them. The next section turns to some of the 
modelling practices that would appear to structure such optimistic findings and interpretations. 
The implications of model design and assumptions 
Modellers themselves have highlighted the way in which simulating SAI by reducing solar irradiance, 
rather than by introducing aerosols appears to better counter greenhouse gas forcings (Niemeier et 
al 2013; Ferraro et al 2014; Yu et al 2015). But this is only one distorting practice, and in some 
respects a superficial one, easily rectified. Here I focus in on three key more deep-rooted and 
pervasive features of the modelling practices that appear to help construct the optimistic narratives: 
use of inappropriate counterfactuals; overconfidence in the predictability and controllability of SAI; 
and largely ignoring variation in vulnerability. Not only do these features tend to over-simplify 
assessments and focus attention on specific dimensions of justice, while framing out others, but 




could be just. This is not to suggest that models should be expanded to try to better incorporate 
justice, rather that presumptions about justice must be unpacked to create opportunities to explore 
and experiment with the implications of alternative assumptions and conceptions of justice. 
Extreme counterfactuals, catastrophism and the clean sheet 
Modelling studies typically contrast high greenhouse gas worlds (in a majority of cases, a 4xCO2 
greenhouse) in the presence or absence of SRM, rather than contrasting the outcomes of SRM with 
either preindustrial climates or the outcomes of partial mitigation (see Table 1). This almost 
universal choice of counterfactual appears to reflect a common belief that adequate mitigation has 
become politically or practically implausible (e.g. Keith 2013). Mitigation effort may indeed be 
currently inadequate to avoid dangerous climate change, and it might even be true that no practical 
rate of improvement in mitigation could avert dangerous climate change; but it is unreasonable to 
imply that no progress will be made to reverse emissions growth even as impacts become severe 
and immediate.  
Using a counterfactual of unabated climate change makes modelling results easier to identify and 
the effects of different factors easier to isolate, but it also exacerbates the potential for 
consideration of climate geoengineering to distract attention from other responses - the so called 
‘moral hazard’ (Gardiner 2010; Morrow 2014b; Corner and Pidgeon 2014; McLaren 2016a). In its 
political form, moral hazard suggests decision makers may be tempted to avoid controversial or 
costly decisions to mitigate in favour of hypothetical future SRM. This would exacerbate risks for 
future generations if SAI failed to work as expected, or were prevented or halted by political 
disagreement. Inappropriate counterfactuals unintentionally foster a misleading impression that 
SRM is a direct alternative to mitigation (despite apparently well-intentioned assertions to the 
contrary by most researchers). Such counterfactuals also make SAI more palatable, because in 
comparisons with unabated climate change, any potential negative disparities arising from SAI 
appear less significant if the alternative appears to be a climate catastrophe. As shown above, such 
comparison has already restricted the identification of ‘novel’ or ‘harmful’ climates in some 
modelling work.  
Moreover, this framing of the distributional consequences of unabated climate change presents 
them as virtually inevitable, if unintended, and thus in certain respects as of less moral consequence 
than if they were recognised as the result of active human agency (Morrow 2014a). This is not to 
claim that SRM modellers are unconcerned by climate injustice, rather that the construction of their 
models incidentally deflects attention from the historic causes of that injustice and the potential for 
its attempted rectification by accelerated mitigation. The more the framing of the models reinforces 
the claim that it is physically impractical and politically unrealistic to avoid a high greenhouse gas 
world (McLaren 2016b), and the more focus is drawn to technological means of avoiding the 
extremes of climate impacts, the less attention we can expect to be paid to any moral obligations 
arising from historic emissions. In this way the models reflect a sort of ‘clean sheet’ analysis that 
looks only forward, and in which past responsibility for emissions, and any form of corrective justice, 




Uncertainty and control  
As seen in the quotes so far, the language of modelling is replete with claims that SAI 'can', or ‘will’ 
deliver certain outcomes, or could be managed, modulated, targeted, or optimised. However, not 
only are these claims products only of modelling, not empirical experiments, they also ignore the 
practicalities of delivery and control. Bellamy (2016), following Stirling (2003), criticises climate 
geoengineering appraisals generally for a narrow focus on risk and a failure to recognise 
uncertainties. The modelling literature largely assumes away uncertainties in three spheres: in the 
technologies for SAI, within the models themselves, and in the monitoring and control mechanisms 
that would connect them (see Table 1). Such uncertainties may be critical to judgements about the 
desirability of SAI, as seen, for example in the caveats raised by most of the modellers who have 
sought to simulate aerosol injection directly, rather than by simulating reduced solar irradiance. 
Moreover, if SAI might not be practically realisable or controllable, then any deterrent or delay to 
mitigation becomes much more risky. 
In the first sphere, even the most optimistic researchers concede significant ‘non-trivial’ 
uncertainties that demand further research into SAI technologies (Keith 2013) while other natural 
and social scientists suggest the technical challenges may be so great that a practical, cost-effective 
and socially and politically acceptable system may never be feasible (Hunt cited in Koplewitz 2015; 
Stilgoe 2015). In other words, technologies for precise and controllable delivery of aerosols imagined 
in the modelling might remain imaginary, called into being only by the parameters and functioning 
of the models (Wiertz 2016). This offers little confidence that SAI could be targeted effectively. Yet 
MacMartin, Keith et al (2013) largely dismiss the question. They confess: “We do not address how 
one might achieve the desired forcing distributions” (p.367), but argue that “Although these 
variations may be difficult to achieve in practice, it is premature to presume today what variations 
might ultimately be achievable … [future] engineered particles or space-based systems might enable 
more control over the distribution of solar reduction” (p.366). 
Even if the physical challenges can be surmounted, managed delivery would rely on models that 
permit us reasonably to predict the climate outcomes of any climate geoengineering intervention, 
and control systems that would deliver the desired effects, in the face of huge lags and complexity in 
feedbacks (also attributed using models). The uncertainties involved in this second sphere are also 
substantial. To confidently predict the sort of detail reported above would require models that 
accurately reflect complex connections between different climatic regions, yet even the interactions 
between hemispheres and latitudes are only now emerging (Haywood et al 2013; Jones et al 2017). 
For example, climate models generally fail to capture several significant dynamic responses in the 
northern hemisphere observed following tropical volcanic eruptions (Driscoll et al 2012) and often 
miss dynamic effects of aerosols on ocean circulation in the southern hemisphere (McCusker et al 
2015). This may not cast doubt on the potential for SAI to cool the climate generally, but must give 
researchers pause in claiming that they can predict regional effects adequately.  
When considering the uncertainty in models, the distinctions between runs, ensembles, and 
controlled inter-model comparisons must be acknowledged. Individual runs have inherent 
variability. Ensembles can embody consistent biases. Inter-comparison studies encompass a broader 
range of possible outcomes, but are still constrained by the selection of scenarios, and can establish 




improved further, they will inevitably remain inherently incomplete and uncertain (Curry and 
Webster 2011; Stilgoe 2015). Moreover, seeking to reduce variations in modelled climatic responses 
may distract attention disproportionately from the implications of social, economic, cultural and 
political vulnerabilities, considered in the next section. 
In the third sphere, technical controllability, the literature is sparse. MacMartin, Kravitz et al (2013) 
and MacMartin et al (2014) find that cybernetic feedback could be used to control model 
temperature outputs, even with limited understanding and a crude model. However they note 
fundamental trade-offs, such that managing uncertainty risks amplifying variability. MacMartin, 
Kravitz et al’s approach is essentially technocratic, although they do acknowledge that technical 
requirements for rapid feedback control “may be incompatible with … a stable decision-making 
process that is able to gain legitimacy” (2013:255). Jackson et al (2015) report an experimental 
approach that begins to explore such problems, using two layers of modelling and iteration of 
interventions in annual rounds, targeting Arctic sea-ice retention. The researchers were able to 
establish control over the model (after about a decade), but their experience suggests that in reality, 
with political and social influences as well as technical ones, the controllability of SRM remains highly 
uncertain. And even if control were to prove plausible, it would raise serious procedural justice 
questions regarding how all those affected might participate in governance of a managed climate. 
At the present state of knowledge, moreover, SAI would appear to involve a wider range and scale of 
uncertainties than mitigation (although MacMartin et al (2015) find that the uncertainties of climate 
change and solar geoengineering appear to be at least partly offsetting, rather than additive). These 
uncertainties mean that climate impacts may be more evenly or unevenly distributed than the 
models imply. But, equally critically, the level of uncertainty itself is significant for justice in the same 
way as climate variability. Groups with greater capabilities, strong social capital, and majority 
recognition are simply less vulnerable to uncertainty about future climates than those with weak 
capabilities, limited social capital or suffering misrecognition (McLaren 2017). 
Variation in vulnerability 
Other features of the modelling methodologies and practices – especially the implicit 
characterization of affected populations – also shape how justice implications are revealed and 
interpreted. Inappropriate or limited criteria, aggregation and implicit assumptions of uniform 
preferences and values can all act to frame out important dimensions and questions of vulnerability. 
Vulnerability shapes experiences of extreme weather more than meteorology (Stilgoe 2015); and for 
climate impacts, vulnerability matters as much or more than the physical climate outcomes. In 
climate impacts assessment, vulnerability and exposure are considered separately to physical 
outcomes, but for climate geoengineering such a systematic approach is currently lacking. At best 
simplistic indicators are used for weighting impacts, and often issues of vulnerability are simply 
passed over, with perhaps a brief caveat (see Table 1). 
Varied vulnerability to factors such as heatwaves, drought, or the timing of rainfall or frosts could 
exacerbate distributional inequalities. The simplistic indicators used in modelling, such as economic 
value, crop production or demographic weighting, do not reflect the reality that “in different regions 
different kinds of changes matter … [and] relevant physical indicators for an assessment of SRM 




also presupposes that all affected populations have the same underlying preferences. But: “even 
limited variation in actors’ preferences about a target climate state can significantly change 
assessments of regional disparities from SRM” (Heyen et al 2015: 2). Once additional climate 
variables - beyond average temperature and precipitation - are considered, the likelihood of such 
disagreements grows. As a result, those who control the choice of model, the choice of criteria and 
the weightings given to different factors hold a great deal of discursive power. 
Moreno-Cruz et al (2012) contrast SRM deployment under outcomes weighted by ‘utilitarian’ 
economic output, and ‘egalitarian’ population numbers. They estimate that: “precipitation induced 
population-weighted damages will increase by 51% if we optimize for output-weighted temperature 
damages … [but] minimizing population-weighted precipitation changes simultaneously 
compensates for [only] 69% of utilitarian temperature damages” (p659). In other words, while there 
are significant overlaps, political contestation could well result from different underlying values. 
Aaheim et al (2015) model economic consequences, and also find a mix of winners and losers from 
SRM, with some regions where the economic effects are negative in all their scenarios.  
Increasing computational capacity and improved data has tempted modellers to try to assess 
distributional implications in such ways, potentially generating useful inputs for political discussion. 
Nonetheless technical limitations of climate models and data availability mean researchers have 
“tended to assess regional disparities on spatial levels … that do not match with any socially 
meaningful categories” (Heyen et al 2015:13). Irvine et al (2010) make their conclusions based on 
just five 'illustrative' regions (US mainland, Western Europe, Eastern China, Australia and Brazil). 
Such aggregation “averages out small scale spatial differences ... [producing] more positive 
assessments of SRM’s distributional effects” (Heyen et al 2015:13). Modellers also aggregate 
temporally over multi-year periods, thus potentially underweighting changes in annual variability 
and extreme events.  
Aggregation is just one of the ways in which uncertainty – which multiplies at smaller scales - is de-
emphasized. Moreover, vulnerability is not just a function of location, for example, being 
dramatically different for waged and subsistence populations in the same localities. Vulnerability is 
variegated in multiple dimensions. And some vulnerabilities would not be reduced significantly by 
SAI. SRM does not reduce ocean acidification, or its impacts on communities dependent on fisheries 
or the protective effects of growing reefs. Insofar as climate geoengineering exerts any deterrent on 
mitigation, such impacts would then be exacerbated. Such deterrent effects would also sustain 
existing injustices in the fossil energy system, particularly those associated with extraction of fossil 
fuels or the distributed effects of air pollution from combustion in power generation or vehicles.  
Revealed conceptions of justice 
Collectively – and perhaps in response to climate policy-makers’ demands for greater certainty - this 
literature tends to treat models primarily as truth machines that can be refined and tweaked to 
provide an ever-improving representation or prediction of reality. It consistently proposes further 
research, rather than calling directly for deployment, although there is currently a live debate over 
the desirability of small scale field trials, which might help resolve some technical uncertainties 
(Dykema et al, 2014), but would not provide evidence of regional distributive effects (Lenferna et al, 




of particular modulated forms of SAI deployment. Although modellers often question their 
approaches and assumptions, and take care to specify technical uncertainties, the mode of such 
questioning rarely engages with more fundamental questions regarding the purpose or nature of 
modelling, nor the values and conceptions of justice embedded in the practices of modelling. I would 
speculate that this may represent defensiveness about the validity of climate modelling resulting 
from political controversy and the attacks of climate denialists (as described by Brown 2010); but as 
shown in the preceding section, it can have serious implications. Here I briefly summarize the largely 
unquestioned conceptions of justice revealed in the modelling literature. 
In modelling efforts to minimise trade-offs and ‘optimise’ SAI, the approach to ethics and justice is 
primarily consequentialist (embedded in a liberal social imaginary of risk-management (Groves 
2014)). Harms and benefits experienced by people are central to modelling approaches and 
interpretation, rather than, for example, deontological rules of action. The literature tends to 
overlook the prospect that not all those disadvantaged by climate change could be compensated by 
SAI, and indeed some may even experience a worse situation; or engages with it only in ways that 
treat these losers as acceptable collateral in a utilitarian balance. The underlying assumptions – 
rarely offered explicitly – are broadly utilitarian: justice is found in minimising aggregate suffering, or 
maximising aggregate wellbeing (Sinnott-Armstrong 2015). 
These underlying philosophies are sometimes accompanied by distributional conceptions of justice, 
which particularly reflect Rawlsian western liberal approaches (Rawls 1971; Lamont and Favor 2013). 
A few modellers (eg Moreno-Cruz et al 2012) pay attention to the regional distribution of climate 
outcomes, and explore ways to minimise harms to the most disadvantaged groups. While the 
Pareto-optimisation approaches typically applied are rather utilitarian, the idea that disparities are 
acceptable only where they benefit the worst off (Rawls’ ‘difference principle’) also seems 
influential. However, as the preceding sections show, claims about the distributional justice of SAI 
arising from the modelling literature are rather less certain than might first appear. The potential for 
countervailing mitigation-deterrent effects, for greater uncertainties and for differently variegated 
vulnerabilities all make it difficult to draw meaningful conclusions in a liberal justice paradigm. 
Earlier work on the distribution of benefits and burdens from climate change (eg Anthoff et al 2009) 
reinforces this concern. They find that, even within a consequentialist paradigm, introducing equity-
weightings substantially raises estimates of the social costs of carbon emissions, and such estimates 
differ by two orders of magnitude depending on the region to which the equity weights are 
normalised. Moreover, estimates may be more than twice as high if national rather than (global) 
regional impacts are aggregated. Such variations arise not only from differential warming, but also 
from variations in income, growth rates, and vulnerabilities. Given such a mix, we cannot presume 
that reducing climate impacts alone through climate geoengineering will necessarily promote justice.   
Collectively these factors also suggest that SAI might be less just than it might appear on the face of 
the models, especially if considered against a broader set of dimensions of justice. The next section 
begins to elaborate such a broader, plural approach, highlighting the desirability of supplementing 
distribution with procedure, correction and recognition (in ways – particularly drawing on 
capabilities and care - that transcend the binary of utilitarian/consequentialist and deontological 





Conceptions of justice and discourses of climate geoengineering 
Climate change and its causes impact on multiple dimensions of justice. Simply examining 
distributional effects does not give a complete picture. Not only will political responses to climate 
change and climate geoengineering depend on varied impacts and preferences for particular climate 
outcomes, they will equally depend on how various cultures interpret and conceive of justice. Here I 
therefore identify ways in which broader conceptions of justice, beyond distribution, might be 
relevant – considering each of the plural dimensions identified by environmental justice scholars (eg 
Schlosberg 2007) in turn, and discussing briefly how they are framed out in the modelling literature. I 
then connect these framing effects with predominant discourses in climate geoengineering science 
and politics. This is a disembodied analysis, in which the principles embodied in climate 
geoengineering modelling are derived from the literature. It does not seek to impute motivations or 
beliefs to the modellers, but rather to surface some important constraints and limitations of their 
work, within the co-produced cultural, economic and institutional context of climate science and 
policy, with the hope of stimulating more reflexive responses.  
Broadening conceptions of justice  
Procedural justice focuses on the involvement of people in decisions that affect them. Just as public 
engagement in the development and design of new technology is critical because technologies can 
reshape moral landscapes and help lock-in particular social practices (Cotton 2014; Stilgoe 2015), so 
is public engagement in the design of models. As Bohman (1999) argues, public engagement in 
research design can support a pragmatic politics of inclusion, turning expert knowledge into a shared 
resource and supporting emergent publics to overcome disadvantage. But with rare exceptions, 
models and scenarios are typically constructed with no consultation of publics, which could helpfully 
be used to inform the choices of technologies, parameters or scenarios to model or even to shape 
the criteria informing the research as a whole (Bellamy et al 2014).(6) This shortcoming privileges 
expertise, fails to recognise the necessarily partial nature of scientific knowledge (Ottinger 2013) and 
treats justice as something determined by elite institutions, rather than something participatory and 
procedural (McLaren et al 2013). Such procedural aspects are especially important insofar as climate 
geoengineering converts future climates into chosen, intentional artifacts, rather than unintended 
side effects of other beneficial activities. Intentionality reconfigures moral considerations (Morrow 
2014a). It also makes it as important to scrutinise the implications of not using the technologies as 
the implications of deployment, and introduces new dynamics and challenges to international 
politics. But the addition of fair procedure alone still leaves the analysis within the standard 
consequentialist paradigm of the dominant social imaginary. 
We begin to escape this paradigm by understanding the ways in which effective procedural justice 
and participatory parity demand recognition of people’s status as full moral equals in society (Fraser 
and Honneth 2003). In largely ignoring vulnerabilities, and aggregating across multiple individuals, 
the dominant paradigm (and the models that reflect it) rather presuppose an artificial equality. Real 
world capacities to participate are instead highly variegated, and often constrained by institutional 
and cultural misrecognition. Similarly in applying implicit value assumptions about universal and 
equal preferences and criteria, the models fail to recognise real cultural variation. Justice as 




Lack of attention to variation in vulnerability also exposes the ways in which conceptions of justice 
drawing on capabilities (Sen 2009) or care (Held 2006) are overlooked in considering the implications 
of the models. The capabilities approach focuses on justice as freedom – enabled by universal 
enjoyment of essential capabilities for functioning such as political participation, health and 
education. Yet actually existing capabilities are unequal. Justice in capability terms demands 
investment in capabilities, building power, enabling people and communities to function without 
dependency and domination. Like the ethics of care, it implies a focusing of our capacity to care on 
those who are vulnerable, ideally supporting them to obtain functioning and autonomy. 
Rather than supporting building capabilities and thus social resilience, the climate modelling 
approaches and practices instead effectively prioritize the ‘removal of a hazard’ (the physical climate 
outcome). This represents a hierarchical model of control that is at worst a form of domination and 
at best, elitist paternalism. It treats those affected by climate change as powerless victims, not as 
potentially capable actors able to participate in determining the conditions of their lives – including 
participating in climate politics. This territory is implicitly reserved for the scientific and political 
elites – notably in the countries which dominate climate geoengineering research: the US, UK, 
Germany and to a lesser degree, China. Moreover, if SRM merely masks the threat of climate 
injustice to future generations, rather than structurally or institutionally removing it in the way 
mitigation and adaptation do (Smith 2012), then there is an equivalent intergenerational injustice 
involved. Put another way, mitigation and adaptation would appear inherently more supportive of 
future people’s freedoms and capabilities because they reduce vulnerability to domination, 
especially if the underlying interventions, in energy systems for example, are undertaken with 
attention to fair distribution, recognition and procedure (Jenkins et al 2016). But this distinction is 
not acknowledged (or perhaps cannot be acknowledged) in the ways the models construct affected 
populations. 
Finally, in ignoring existing inequalities, vulnerabilities and misrecognition, the modelling literature 
tends to reinforce a ‘clean sheet’ framing that risks excluding corrective or reparative justice. 
Reconciliation, reparation and even punishment can be central to justice, especially where 
vulnerability is a product of previous injustice. So restrictions and financial burdens imposed on 
carbon-intensive corporations and nations by accelerated mitigation and adaptation financing can 
be understood as a concrete representation of climate justice. Corrective or restorative justice also 
ensures that a focus on the victims of climate change does not cause us to ignore the perpetrators: 
which seems critical as addressing the problem demands changes in the behaviours of wealthy 
consumers and investors, particularly with respect to energy. Space precludes a deeper exploration 
of restorative justice here, but it seems clear that whether the aim is ‘punishment’ of ‘climate 
criminals’, or reconciliation between the perpetrators and victims of climate change, climate 
geoengineering - as constructed in the modelling described above - acts to dismiss both the need 
for, and possible mechanisms of, such corrective justice. Moreover any moral hazard effect also 
reduces the corrective implications of mitigation and adaptation policy, leaving those who have 
profited from the causes of climate change to continue to enjoy their benefits. Ways in which such 
effects could be countered, enabling geoengineering to support restorative justice, merit further 
investigation, especially in a context in which they might be considered as forms of climate repair or 




Framing out justice, ignoring power 
The foregoing suggests that the modelling literature embodies narrow, largely utilitarian, 
conceptions of justice. Space precludes a full elaboration of the implications of these presumptions, 
or a discussion of the extent to which these conceptions accurately reflect or apply particular 
theories of justice. Here I focus on one aspect, the lack of plurality demonstrated. I outline how a 
richer understanding of justice might instead reveal and begin to respond to the power relations 
embodied in the models and related narratives of climate change. Here power is understood as 
asymmetric capability or agency (Stirling 2014).  
The technological optimism of the modelling literature frames SAI as practical, manageable and 
governable. The counterfactual of unabated climate change reproduces a ‘political realism' in which 
mitigation remains minimal. Together these risk a form of post-political, technological solutionism 
(McLaren 2016b), which presents another source of moral hazard. In the face of the constraints and 
difficulties of international climate politics, it should not be surprising that researchers and 
modellers are keen to explore climate geoengineering, even while they continue to advocate 
accelerated mitigation and adaptation. However, the solutionist mind-set redefines problems such 
that the novel technology appears as the solution, notably in ways that bypass messy political, 
cultural or behavioural changes (Morozov 2013). Reducing consumption, changing profligate 
lifestyles, or adopting costly or inconvenient practices becomes not only impractical but also 
unnecessary in solutionist responses to climate change. Yet these are the responses typically 
advocated as essential to deliver climate justice (Athanasiou and Baer 2002), and similarly, 
consideration of demand-side responses is critical to energy justice (Jenkins et al 2016). 
Solutionism shifts power and authority from politics to science and technology, but typically without 
democratising the latter. Simultaneously, the high apparent leverage of SAI forms of SRM could be 
expected to concentrate power, giving it an essentially centralising and autocratic ‘social 
constitution’ (Szersynski et al 2013). In this light, a scheme of SRM designed to benefit the poorest 
(such as those explored by Moreno-Cruz et al 2012) would seem unlikely to be implemented even if 
technically feasible (Stilgoe 2015). The new climates resulting from SAI suggest incentives for 
powerful nations to prefer distributional patterns that could impose greater risks on poorer and less 
powerful groups. Such an outcome need not rely on unilateral imposition, as poorer countries might 
well accede to a distributional schema designed by the powerful for its generic benefits or for other 
political reasons. Nor can we assume that the political interests of poor country governments would 
coincide with the interests of their poorest inhabitants.  
Power is perhaps overlooked for the same reasons as moral hazard: SRM modellers typically treat 
technology as something morally neutral, on which they can act, but which does not act on them. 
But technologies not only cause us to adjust our behaviours but also condition our agency and 
reframe our moral and political choices (Verbeek 2011; Cotton 2014). Even the technical capacity to 
model climate geoengineering has such a reframing effect, in that simulations based on SRM open 
questions of desirable climate outcomes or ‘designer climates’ (Wiertz 2016). Justice is only one 
dimension of the moral choices raised here, but other aspects lie beyond the scope of this paper. 
If the technologies of climate modelling - like those of climate geoengineering – are understood as 
embedded co-constituted parts of socio-technical systems, it becomes easier to understand how 




assumptions of models, not only their use and interpretation; and that values and facts cannot be 
treated as independent, but are different aspects of a system in which politics, power and 
technology are co-constituted. Of course justice should be similarly conceptualised – as it is in 
environmental justice theory - as something negotiated, contested and co-constituted, not as 
something separate, abstract and ideal. By treating models as games of make-believe, researchers 
could not only open up climate geoengineering appraisal (Bellamy 2016) but also create 
opportunities to experiment (both with, and on) the models, as Stilgoe suggests (2015), in ways that 
assist with deliberation and negotiation over both climate technologies and climate justice. There is 
great potential for scientific collaborations across disciplines to conduct different analyses with the 
models, and conduct modelling experiments using different concepts of justice to help challenge the 
shortcomings identified here. Social science is not only valuable for communicating the results of 
modelling to the public and policy makers, but integrated into research programs it can help 
introduce social values and concerns into the design of modelling experiments. 
Of course, models are only part of the complex machinery used to anticipate the future. We cannot 
expect modelling and modellers to solve all these problems alone. But in the case of climate policy, 
modelling is central not only to other forms of anticipation and speculation (Stilgoe 2015) but to the 
politics and epistemology of climate change. So it is critical – for climate and energy research - to 
challenge how models are constructed and deployed, and to understand how political and social 
values – for example about risk, participation or justice - are embodied through design assumptions. 
Re-building models to respond to such an understanding will not be easy. Researchers should seek 
to recognize and understand the limitations of models, and seek to compensate for them. That the 
models will nevertheless remain incomplete does not render them irrelevant or inappropriate. It 
does, however, mandate that the models be put into dialogue with ethical and moral discourse. 
Designing models and experiments on models that deploy a reflexive approach to SAI, as in some 
ways a subject rather than only an object, should be the goal. Modelling should experiment with a 
wider range of counterfactuals; with scenarios designed through public engagement; with more 
random variation to simulate control problems; and more experiments using real human beings as 
control actors, representing diverse interests. This means designing trans-disciplinary research 
programs that genuinely engage with political, social and cultural dimensions of climate policy, not 
merely seeking to abstractly model the political and social alongside the scientific. Such approaches 
would appear urgently needed in a policy world which appears increasingly polarized over the 
desirability of SRM research and testing in the light of the 1.5°C climate aspiration agreed in Paris 
(Nicholson et al 2017). Otherwise we might fear a repetition of the process in which carbon 
geoengineering has been absorbed into climate pathways models without proper assessment of its 
technical limitations or ethical risks (Anderson 2015; Peters and Geden 2017).   
 
Conclusions 
In summary, the values and conceptions of justice revealed as underpinning SRM modelling 
exercises and the representations they produce are predominantly consequential rather than 
procedural; attending to the distribution of benefits and harms, rather than to underlying 
capabilities; individualist and aggregative rather than collective; fail to raise questions of recognition, 




ignore international cultural and political variations. The literature mainly displays a utilitarian bent, 
accepting and reinforcing substantial economic inequality, in the name of political realism - 
presuming that radical socio-economic change is infeasible, even while exploring ways to reduce 
other dimensions of climate injustice. This does not necessarily reflect the personal convictions of 
the researchers involved, but is a product of practical limitations of modelling, combined with the 
co-produced discourses, imaginaries and institutions that constrain and condition the agency of 
modellers.  
Although SAI might offer justice gains when contrasted with unabated climate change, when 
compared with perfect mitigation it appears much less just. But neither unabated climate change 
nor perfect mitigation is plausible: it is essential to explore relative justice effects in responses 
involving mixtures of more or less mitigation, adaptation and climate geoengineering. In this context 
it is problematic that SAI techniques would not only generate different winners and losers with 
reconfigured climates but also distribute power, freedoms and capabilities in new and potentially 
harmful ways across populations and generations. 
The climate geoengineering modelling literature also tends to overlook or devalue issues such as the 
relative vulnerability of affected populations; extant obligations resulting from disproportionate 
historical contributions to emissions; the distribution of power to decide over the design of any SAI 
intervention; the extent to which uncertainties in controllability and governance of SAI could 
undermine efforts to mitigate distributional impacts; the ethical implications of the intentional 
creation of new climates. All these would appear to contribute to the risks of a ‘moral hazard’ effect 
delaying or deterring mitigation (McLaren 2016a), and thus increasing exposure to any harms from 
climate geoengineering, residual climate change and sustained extraction and use of fossil fuels in 
energy systems.  
In part these are products of a broader epistemic problem of implicitly yet hubristically treating and 
portraying climate and energy models as truth-machines rather than games of make-believe or 
sandpits. This paper has suggested particular shortcomings in the climate geoengineering literature’s 
often implicit assumptions of effectiveness, precision and controllability, its metrics and methods of 
aggregation, and its use of an excessive counterfactual of unabated climate change. The first means 
that risks of failure, moral hazard and uncertain distributional effects over space and time all receive 
inadequate attention. The second fails to recognise localised and variegated vulnerability and 
existing inequalities that might be exacerbated. And the last misrepresents the avoidance of a high 
greenhouse gas world as impractical and politically unrealistic, focusing attention on technological 
means of avoiding the extremes of climate impacts and away from moral obligations arising from 
historic emissions and other injustices of energy systems.  
As a result, the dominant constructions of justice in climate geoengineering appear likely to bolster 
the existing power of global, Northern elites to resist demands for climate justice from 
predominantly Southern subaltern groups. In failing to engage with the heterogeneity of justice as 
procedure, reparation, freedom, recognition, or care for the vulnerable the discipline risks 
diminishing the prospects of responses to climate change that genuinely enhance global justice. And, 
under pressure to provide pathways to a 1.5°C world, there seems a real risk that the promise of 




The promise of climate geoengineering – control over the climate – is also a threat, if future climates 
might be controlled or chosen by the powerful, in line with their interests and values. The modelling 
outcomes indicate that it would be unfair if ‘interests’ referred only to climate preferences. It would 
be even worse if the possibility of climate geoengineering were mobilised to restrict mitigation and 
protect elite financial interests in the current high-carbon fossil-fuelled energy system and economy. 
The question of who controls the technology is clearly critical. But even while the technologies 
themselves remain imaginaries, modelling also raises the question of who controls the discourses 
that effectively arbitrate what is and is not practical and just in climate policy. Focusing on the 
outcomes of models avoids accountability for the assumptions and conceptions of justice involved in 
building them. Rather than promoting deliberation and reflection, the scientific discourses risk 
prematurely closing down debate. Just like the moral implications of climate geoengineering, the 
moral implications of modelling must be taken seriously in design as well as use. 
 
Acknowledgements 
This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-
profit sectors. This paper began as a presentation at the Plurality and Politics of Environmental Justice seminar 
at UEA in June 2015. I want to thank the organisers and participants for the inspiring and constructive 
discussion. It was substantially rewritten during a short residency at the Institute for Advanced Sustainability 
Studies (IASS) in Potsdam in June 2016. Stefan Schäfer and Mark Lawrence for the opportunity, and to seminar 
discussants at IASS for their detailed feedback. My thanks are also due to several anonymous reviewers, whose 
comments helped me improved the paper significantly. Gordon Walker, Nils Markusson, Thilo Wiertz and 
Elizabeth Cooper also read and commented on various drafts: they all deserve my gratitude too. Errors of 
course remain entirely my responsibility.  
 
References  
Aaheim, A., Romstad, B., Wei, T,  Kristjánsson, J.E., Muri, H., Niemeier, U. and Schmidt, H. 2015. An economic 
evaluation of solar radiation management. Science of the Total Environment, 532: 61–69 
Anderson, K. 2015. Duality in Climate Science. Nature Geoscience 8 (Dec) 898-900. 
Anthoff, D., C. Hepburn and R.S.J. Tol, 2009. Equity weighting and the marginal damage costs of climate 
change. Ecological Economics, 68(3): 836-849, doi: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2008.06.017  
Armstrong, C. 2017. ‘Climate Change’. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. DOI: 
10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.231 
Athanasiou, T. and Baer, P. 2002. Dead Heat: global justice and global warming. New York: Seven Stories Press.  
Baatz, C. 2016. Can We Have It Both Ways? On Potential Trade-Offs Between Mitigation and Solar Radiation 
Management. Environmental Values 25: 29–49. 
Bala, G, Duffy, P.B. and Taylor K.E. 2008. Impact of geoengineering schemes on the global hydrological cycle. 
PNAS, 105(22):7664–69 doi:10.1073pnas.0711648105  
Ban-Weiss G.A. and Caldeira, K. 2010. Geoengineering as an optimization problem. Environ. Res. Lett. 




Bellamy, R., J. Chilvers, and N.E. Vaughan, 2014. Deliberative Mapping of options for tackling climate change: 
Citizens and specialists ‘open up’ appraisal of geoengineering. Public Understanding of Science, 25(3): 269-286 
Bellamy, R. 2016. A sociotechnical framework for governing climate engineering. Science, Technology, & 
Human Values 41(2):135-62.  
Bickerstaff, K. Walker, G. and Bulkeley, H. 2013. “Introduction: Making sense of Energy Justice.” In Energy 
Justice in a Changing Climate, 1-13. London: Zed Books. 
Bohman, J. 1999. Democracy as Inquiry, Inquiry as Democratic: Pragmatism, Social Science, and the Cognitive 
Division of Labor. American Journal of Political Science 43(2): 590-607. doi:10.2307/2991808 
Brown, A.S. 2010. Climate models and their critics. The Bent Of Tau Beta Pi (Winter): 19-24, online at 
https://www.tbp.org/pubs/features/w10brown.pdf 
Cairns, R. and A. Stirling, 2014. ‘Maintaining planetary systems’ or ‘concentrating global power?’ High stakes in 
contending framings of climate geoengineering. Global Environmental Change, 28: 25-38 
Cao, L., L. Duan, G. Bala, K. Caldeira, 2017. Simultaneous stabilization of global temperature and precipitation 
through cocktail geoengineering. Geophys. Res. Lett. 37 (D6). doi: 10.1002/2017GL074281. 
Corner, A. and Pidgeon, N. 2014. Geoengineering, climate change scepticism and the ‘moral hazard’ argument: 
an experimental study of UK public perceptions. Phil. Trans. R.Soc. A 372. doi:10.1098/rsta.2014.0063 
Corry, O. 2015. Review of ‘Models as Make-Believe’ by Adam Toon. British Journal of Aesthetics 55(1):126-28. 
Cotton, M. 2014. Ethics and Technology Assessment: A Participatory Approach. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. 
Curry, C.L., Sillmann, J., Bronaugh, D. Alterskjaer, K and 10 others. 2014. A multimodel examination of climate 
extremes in an idealized geoengineering experiment, J. Geophys. Res. Atmos., 119:3900–23. 
doi:10.1002/2013JD020648 
Curry J.A. and, P.J. Webster, 2011. Climate science and the uncertainty monster. Bull Am Meteorol Soc. 
92:1667–1682. 
Driscoll, S., Bozzo, A., Gray, L.J., Robock, A and Stenchikov, G. 2012. Coupled Model Intercomparison Project 5 
(CMIP5) simulations of climate following volcanic eruptions, J. Geophys. Res. 11(D17105). 
doi:10.1029/2012JD017607 
Dykema, J. D. Keith, J.G. Anderson, and D. Weisenstein, 2014. Stratospheric controlled perturbation 
experiment (SCoPEx): a small-scale experiment to improve understanding of the risks of solar geoengineering. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A, 372, doi: 10.1098/rsta.2014.0059 
Edwards, P.N. 2011. History of climate modeling. WIREs Clim. Change 2:128-39. doi: 10.1002/wcc.95 
Ferraro, A.J., A.J. Charlton-Perez, E.J. Highwood, 2014. A Risk-Based Framework for Assessing the Effectiveness 
of Stratospheric Aerosol Geoengineering. PLoS ONE 9(2): e88849. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0088849 
Flato, G.M. 2011. Earth system models: an overview. WIREs Clim. Change, 2:783-800. doi: 10.1002/wcc.148 
Fraser, N. and Honneth, A. 2003. Redistribution or recognition? A political-philosophical exchange. London: 
Verso. 
Fuss, S., J.G. Canadell, G.P. Peters, M. Tavoni, R.M. et al, 2014. Betting on negative emissions. Nature Climate 
Change 4: 850-53. 
Galarraga, M. and Szerszynski, B. 2012. “Making climates: solar radiation management and the ethics of 
fabrication.” In Engineering the Climate: The Ethics of Solar Radiation Management, edited by C.J. Preston, 




Gardiner, S.M. 2010. “Is ‘Arming the Future’ with Geoengineering Really the Lesser Evil?” In Climate Ethics: 
Essential readings, edited by S.M. Gardiner, S. Caney, D. Jamieson and H. Shue, 284-312. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Groves, C. Care, Uncertainty and Intergenerational Ethics. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. 
Hansson, A. 2014. Ambivalence in calculating the future: the case of re-engineering the world. Journal of 
Integrative Environmental Sciences, 11(2): 125-142, DOI:10.1080/1943815X.2014.921629 
Haywood, J.M., Jones, A., Bellouin, N and Stephenson, D. 2013. Asymmetric forcing from stratospheric 
aerosols impacts Sahelian rainfall. Nature Climate Change, 3:660-65. doi:10.1038/NCLIMATE1857  
Held, V. 2006. The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, Global. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Heyen D., Wiertz, T. and Irvine, P. 2015. ‘Radiation Management Impacts: Limitations to Simple Assessments 
and the Role of Diverging Preferences.’ IASS Working Paper. Potsdam: Institute for Advanced Sustainability 
Studies, doi.org/10.2312/iass.2015.001 
Horton, J. and D. Keith, ‘Solar geoengineering and obligations to the global poor.’ pp79-92 in C.J. Preston (ed) 
Climate Justice and Geoengineering: Ethics and Policy in the Atmospheric Anthropocene. London: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2016. 
Hourdequin, M. ‘Justice, recognition and climate change.’ pp33-48 in C.J. Preston (ed) Climate Justice and 
Geoengineering: Ethics and Policy in the Atmospheric Anthropocene. London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2016. 
Irvine, P.J., Ridgwell, A. and Lunt, D.J. 2010. Assessing the regional disparities in geoengineering impacts. 
Geophysical Research Letters, 37(L18702):6pp. doi:10.1029/2010GL044447 
Irvine, P.J., Sriver, R.L. and Keller, K. 2012. Tension between reducing sea-level rise and global warming 
through solar-radiation management. Nature Climate Change, 2:97-100. doi: 10.1038/NCLIMATE1351  
Jackson, L.S., Crook, J.A., Jarvis, A. Leedal, D., Ridgwell, A., Vaughan, N. and Forster, P.M. 2015. Assessing the 
controllability of Arctic sea ice extent by sulfate aerosol geoengineering. Geophysical Research Letters 42:1223-
31. doi:10.1002/2014GL062240  
Jasanoff, S. 2003. Technologies of humility: citizen participation in governing science. Minerva 41:223–44 
Jenkins, K., D. McCauley, R. Heffron, H. Stephan and R. Rehner, 2016. Energy justice: A conceptual review 
Energy Research & Social Science 11 (2016) 174–182, DOI: 10.1016/j.erss.2015.10.004 
Jones, A.C., J.M. Haywood, N. Dunstone, K. Emanuel, M.K. Hawcroft, K.I. Hodges & A. Jones, 2017. Impacts of 
hemispheric solar geoengineering on tropical cyclone frequency. Nature Communications, 8: 1382, DOI: 
10.1038/s41467-017-01606-0 
Keith, D. 2013. A Case for Climate Engineering. Cambridge MA: MIT Press/Boston Review Books. 
Kintish, E. 2010. Hack the Planet. London: Wiley. 
Koplewitz, G. 2015. Engineering The Climate. Harvard Political Review, August 28th. Available online at 
http://harvardpolitics.com/world/engineering-climate/ 
Kravitz, B., MacMartin, D.G., Robock, A., Rasch, P.J. and 14 others. 2014. A multi-model assessment of regional 
climate disparities caused by solar geoengineering. Environ. Res. Lett. 9(074013):7pp. doi:10.1088/1748-
9326/9/7/074013 
Lahsen, M. 2005. Seductive Simulations? Uncertainty Distribution Around Climate Models. Social Studies of 
Science 35:895. doi:10.1177/0306312705053049  





Lenferna, G.A., Russotto, R.D., Tan, A., Gardiner, S.M. and Ackerman, T.P. 2017. Relevant climate response 
tests for stratospheric aerosol injection: A combined ethical and scientific analysis. Earth's Future, 5: 577–591. 
doi:10.1002/2016EF000504 
Linnér, B.-O. and V. Wibeck, 2015. Dual high-stake emerging technologies: a review of the climate engineering 
research literature. WIREs Clim Change, 6: 255–268. doi:10.1002/wcc.333 
Lunt, D.J., Ridgwell, A., Valdes, P.J. and Seale, A. 2008. ‘‘Sunshade World’’: A fully coupled GCM evaluation of 
the climatic impacts of geoengineering. Geophysical Research Letters 35(L12710):5pp. 
doi:10.1029/2008GL033674 
MacMartin, D.G., Keith, D.W., Kravitz, B. and Caldeira, K. 2013. Management of trade-offs in geoengineering 
through optimal choice of non-uniform radiative forcing. Nature Climate Change, 3:365-68. 
doi:10.1038/NCLIMATE1722  
MacMartin, D.G., Kravitz, B., Keith, D.W. and Jarvis. A. 2013. Dynamics of the coupled human-climate system 
resulting from closed-loop control of solar geoengineering. Climate Dynamics 43(1/2):243-58. 
MacMartin D.G., Caldeira K. and Keith D.W. 2014. Solar geoengineering to limit the rate of temperature 
change. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A 372. doi:10.1098/rsta.2014.0134  
MacMartin, D.G., B. Kravitz and P.J. Rasch, 2015. On solar geoengineering and climate uncertainty. Geophysical 
Research Letters, 42(17) 7156-7161 DOI: 10.1002/2015GL065391 
Mamo, L. and Fishman, J.R.  2013. Why Justice? Introduction to the Special Issue on Entanglements of Science, 
Ethics, and Justice. Science, Technology, & Human Values 38(2):159-75. 
Markusson, N., M.D. Gjefsen, J.C. Stephens and D. Tyfield, 2017. ‘The political economy of technical fixes: The 
(mis)alignment of clean fossil and political regimes’. Energy Research & Social Science 23: 1–10. 
McCusker, K.E., Battisti, D.S. and Bitz, C.M. 2015. Inability of stratospheric sulfate aerosol injections to 
preserve the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, Geophys. Res. Lett., 42:9pp doi:10.1002/2015GL064314. 
McLaren, D.P., Krieger, K. and Bickerstaff, K. 2013. “Justice in energy system transitions: the case of carbon 
capture and storage.” In Energy Justice in a Changing Climate, edited by K. Bickerstaff, G. Walker and H. 
Bulkeley, 158-81. London: Zed Books.  
McLaren, D.P. 2016a. Mitigation deterrence and the “moral hazard” of solar radiation management. Earth's 
Future, 4: 596–602. doi:10.1002/2016EF000445 
McLaren, D.P. 2016b. ‘Framing out justice: the post-politics of climate engineering discourses.’ In Climate 
Justice and Geoengineering: Ethics and Policy in the Atmospheric Anthropocene, edited by C.J. Preston. 
London: Rowman and Littlefield. 
McLaren, D.P. 2017. Mirror, mirror. Fairness and justice in climate geoengineering. PhD thesis. Lancaster 
University. doi: 10.17635/lancaster/thesis/184 
McLaren, D.P. 2018. In a broken world: Towards an ethics of repair in the Anthropocene. The Anthropocene 
Review, Online ahead of print: April 12, 2018 https://doi.org/10.1177/2053019618767211 
Moreno-Cruz, J.B., Ricke, K.L. and Keith, D.W. 2012. A simple model to account for regional inequalities in the 
effectiveness of solar radiation management. Climatic Change 110:649–68. doi:10.1007/s10584-011-0103-z  
Morozov, E. 2013. To save everything click here. Penguin, London. 
Morrow, D. 2014a. Starting a flood to stop a fire? Some moral constraints on solar radiation management. 
Ethics, Policy & Environment, 17(2):123-38, doi:10.1080/21550085.2014.926056 
Morrow D.R. 2014b. Ethical aspects of the mitigation obstruction argument against climate engineering 




Ottinger, G. 2013. Changing Knowledge, Local Knowledge, and Knowledge Gaps: STS Insights into Procedural 
Justice. Science, Technology, & Human Values 38(2) 250-270. 
Nicholson, S., S. Jinnah & A. Gillespie, 2017. Solar radiation management: a proposal for immediate polycentric 
governance. Climate Politics. Published online: 04 Dec 2017. doi: 10.1080/14693062.2017.1400944 
Niemeier, U., H. Schmidt, K. Alterskjær and J.E. Kristjánsson, 2013. Solar irradiance reduction via climate 
engineering: Impact of different techniques on the energy balance and the hydrological cycle. Journal of 
Geophysical Research: Atmospheres, 118: 11,905–11,917, doi:10.1002/2013JD020445 
Peters, G.P. and Geden, O., 2017. Catalysing a political shift from low to negative carbon, Nature Climate 
Change, 7: 619–62 doi:10.1038/nclimate3369 
Rawls, J. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge MA: Belknap. 
Ricke, K.L., Morgan, M.G. and Allen, M.R. 2010. Regional climate response to solar-radiation management. 
Nature Geoscience, 3:537-541 DOI: 10.1038/NGEO915 
 
 
Robock, A., Oman, L. and Stenchikov, G.L. 2008. Regional climate responses to geoengineering with tropical 
and Arctic SO2 injections, J. Geophys. Res., 113(D16101):15pp doi:10.1029/2008JD010050  
Royal Society, 2009. Geoengineering the climate: science, governance and uncertainty. London: Royal Society.  
Schlosberg, D. 2007. Defining Environmental Justice: Theories, Movements, and Nature. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Schlosberg, D. 2012. Climate Justice and Capabilities: A Framework for Adaptation Policy. Ethics and 
International Affairs, 26(04):445-61. doi:10.1017/S0892679412000615 
Schmidt, H., K. Alterskjær, D. Bou Karam, O. Boucher, A. Jones, J. E. Kristjansson, U. Niemeier, M. Schulz, A. 
Aaheim, F. Benduhn, M. Lawrence and C. Timmreck, 2012. Solar irradiance reduction to counteract radiative 
forcing from a quadrupling of CO2: climate responses simulated by four earth system models. Earth Syst. 
Dynam., 3: 63–78. 
Sen, A. 2009. The Idea of Justice. London: Allen Lane.  
Shackley, S. and Wynne, B. 1996. Representing Uncertainty in Global Climate Change Science and Policy: 
Boundary-Ordering Devices and Authority. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 21(3): 275-302.  
Shrader-Frechette, K. 2002. Environmental Justice: creating equality, reclaiming democracy. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Shue, H. 2014. Climate justice: Vulnerability and Protection. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. 2015. Consequentialism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2015 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/consequentialism/ 
Smith, P.T. 2012. “Domination and the ethics of solar radiation management.” In Engineering the Climate: The 
Ethics of Solar Radiation Management, edited by C.J. Preston, 43-61. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. 
Sovacool, B.K., S.E. Ryan, P.C. Stern, K. Janda, G. Rochlin, D. Spreng,  M.J. Pasqualetti, H. Wilhite and L. 
Lutzenhiser, 2015. Integrating social science in energy research. Energy Research & Social Science, 6:95-99, 
DOI:  10.1016/j.erss.2014.12.005 
Stilgoe, J. 2015. Experiment Earth: Responsible Innovation in Geoengineering. London: Routledge.  
Stirling, A. 2003. “Risk, uncertainty and precaution: Some instrumental implications from the social sciences.” 
In Negotiating change, edited by F. Berkhout, M. Leach, and I. Scoones, 33-76. London: Elgar. 
Stirling, A. 2014. 'Transforming power: Social science and the politics of energy choices', Energy Research & 




Sundberg, M. 2007. Parameterizations as Boundary Objects on the Climate Arena. Social Studies of Science 
37(3):473–88. 
Sundberg, M. 2011. The Dynamics of Coordinated Comparisons: How Simulationists in Astrophysics, 
Oceanography and Meteorology Create Standards for Results. Social Studies of Science 41(1):107-25. 
Svoboda, T. 2016. Aerosol geoengineering deployment and fairness. Environmental Values 25:51-68. 
Swyngedouw, E. 2010. ‘Apocalypse Forever? Post-political Populism and the Spectre of Climate Change.’ 
Theory, Culture & Society, 27 (2–3): 213–32. 
Szerszynski, B., Kearnes, M., Macnaghten, P., Owen R. and Stilgoe, J. 2013. Why solar radiation management 
geoengineering and democracy won’t mix. Environment and Planning A 45:2809-16. 
Tilmes, S., et al. 2013. The hydrological impact of geoengineering in the Geoengineering Model 
Intercomparison Project (GeoMIP), J. Geophys. Res. Atmos., 118, 11,036–11,058, doi:10.1002/jgrd.50868. 
Tilmes, S., A. Jahn, J. E. Kay, M. Holland, and J.-F. Lamarque, 2014. Can regional climate engineering save the 
summer Arctic sea ice? Geophys. Res. Lett., 41, 880–885, doi:10.1002/2013GL058731. 
Toon, A. 2010. “Models as make-believe.” In Beyond Mimesis and Convention edited by R. Frigg and M. Hunter, 
71-96. Dordrecht: Springer. 
Verbeek, P-P. 2011. Moralizing Technology: Understanding And Designing The Morality Of Things. Chicago IL: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Wibeck, V.  A. Hansson and J. Anselm, 2015. Questioning the technological fix to climate change – Lay sense-
making of geoengineering in Sweden. Energy Research & Social Science 7: 23-30. 
Wiertz, T. 2016. Visions of Climate Control: Solar Radiation Management in Climate Simulations. Science, 
Technology, & Human Values 41(3):438-60. doi:10.1177/0162243915606524 
Yu, X., J.C. Moore, X. Cui, A. Rinke, D. Ji, B. Kravitz, JH Yoon, 2015. Impacts, effectiveness and regional 







1. Relevant events include the Climate Engineering Conferences and Symposium held in Berlin in 2014, 
2015 and 2017; and Climate Engineering Summer Schools in Oxford (2013), Harvard (2014) and 
Heidelberg (2015). 
2. Neither, however, could accelerated mitigation be expected to halt sea-level rise. 
3. See for example: http://a-m-e-g.blogspot.se/2012/05/message-from-arctic-methane-emergency.html. 
4. Cao et al (2017) even explore a ‘cocktail’ of SAI plus another proposed technique, cirrus cloud thinning. 
They suggest this could improve the global trade-off between precipitation and temperature effects, 
but not the regionally distributed impacts. 
5. Strictly, given complexity, no future climate would be the same as a past climate. Yet the modelling 
literature often refers to ‘restoring’ climate states. 
6. The Integrated Assessment of Geoengineering Proposals project (http://www.iagp.ac.uk) was an 
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